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Record crop prices are sig-naling the world’s farmers to produce more. The re-
cent prospective acreage report 
released by the USDA shows that 
the ability of U.S. farmers to grow 
more is limited by a lack of land. 
The USDA projects that acreage 
planted to crops in the United 
States will increase by about 1 
percent in 2008 relative to 2007 
acreage and about 2.5 percent 
relative to 2006 acreage. This 
lack of a supply response by U.S. 
farmers shows how insensitive ag-
gregate U.S. planted acreage is to 
price changes, at least in the short 
run. It explains why introducing 
a major new demand for agricul-
tural output in the form of biofuels 
should be expected to have such a 
large impact on commodity prices.
The only way that crop pric-
es will return to lower levels is 
through an expansion in aggre-
gate supply. This expansion can 
come from two sources: expansion 
in land planted to crops in other 
countries and conversion of land 
in the Conservation Reserve Pro-
gram (CRP) in the United States. 
Brazil, Argentina, Africa, and Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe all have 
land resources that are not cur-
rently planted or that could gener-
ate substantially more production. 
We should expect production in 
these areas over the next two to 
fi ve years to increase sharply. 
At current prices and current 
CRP rental rates, a large propor-
tion of CRP land will be taken 
out of the program as contracts 
expire for the simple reason that 
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the returns from crop production 
are now higher than the returns 
that can be obtained from the 
program on most CRP land. In one 
sense, this is how the program is 
supposed to work. When the CRP 
began in 1986, crop prices were so 
low that Congress was desperate 
for any means to reduce supply. 
In addition, the farm crisis was in 
full swing in 1986. CRP rental rates 
acted as a stabilization program 
that created a fl oor on land prices. 
Today, with record high crop and 
land prices, there is no reason to 
use CRP to control supply. Thus, 
the decision to bring CRP land 
back into production would seem 
to serve the public’s interest.
However, most CRP land today 
provides more than supply con-
trol. It also provides a wide array 
of environmental services, includ-
ing critical wildlife habitat, reduc-
tion in nutrient and sediment loads 
in rivers and lakes, and carbon 
sequestration benefi ts. The transi-
tion of CRP from a supply control 
program to an environmental pro-
gram began in the early 1990s and 
continues today. Consequently, the 
public interest in seeing lower crop 
prices needs to be weighed against 
the public interest in maintaining 
the substantial environmental ben-
efi ts of land in CRP. 
Current CRP Policy
If CRP policy remains unchanged, 
perhaps two million acres of CRP 
land per year will be brought back 
into crop production over the next 
10 years as contracts expire. This 
would reduce the size of the pro-
gram from today’s 34 million acres 
to less than 15 million acres. The 
resulting expansion in planted acre-
age will have a noticeable impact 
on aggregate supply because 20 mil-
lion acres represents an increase 
of about 6 percent of 2008 total 
planted acreage. 
In addition to this steady in-
crease in acreage as contracts 
expire, a substantial number of 
landowners will likely decide to 
pay the penalty to break their CRP 
contracts. The current penalty for 
breaking a CRP contract is to pay 
back all amounts that have been 
paid under the contract, includ-
ing annual rental payments and 
cost share amounts, as well as a 
25 percent penalty on one year’s 
rental payment and interest costs 
on the monies paid. For most farm-
ers, these stiff penalties mean that it 
makes no sense to break the con-
tracts. However, for newly signed 
contracts, the penalties are nonex-
istent or small because large pay-
ments have not yet been made. 
In 2006, the USDA moved to re-
enroll or extend many of the con-
tracts that would expire between 
2007 and 2010. During that period, 
CRP contracts for nearly 28 million 
acres were scheduled to expire—
over half of them in 2007. The re-
enrollment and extension program 
(known as REX) was successful in 
re-signing over 23 million acres, in 
part because crop prices had not 
yet signifi cantly increased. Figure 1 
shows the change in possible CRP 
expirations from REX. Under REX, 
acreage was categorized with an 
environmental benefi t index. Owners 
of the most environmentally sensi-
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tive 20 percent of eligible acreage 
were offered new 10- or 15-year CRP 
contracts; the next most sensitive 20 
percent were offered 5-year exten-
sions of their current contracts, then 
the next, 4-year extensions, and so 
on. This structure made sense at the 
time because it locked up the more 
environmentally sensitive land under 
new, longer-term contracts and al-
lowed less environmentally sensitive 
lands to ease back into production 
over a fi ve-year period. However, 
REX sign-up has created an unintend-
ed situation:  the penalty for break-
ing CRP contracts is smaller for the 
more environmentally sensitive land 
than it is for less environmentally 
sensitive land because having a new 
contract greatly reduces the penalty. 
This suggests that the USDA might 
want to consider some possible new 
strategies for the CRP.
Options for the CRP 
USDA has not yet indicated wheth-
er a change in CRP rules is being 
planned for this summer. Livestock 
groups favor reducing or eliminat-
ing early-out penalties for CRP to 
maximize the amount of land that is 
cropped. Environmental groups want 
current rules enforced. If nothing is 
done then, as Figure 1 shows, signifi -
cant expiration of CRP contracts will 
not occur until the fall of 2009. This 
means that much of this land cannot 
be planted until the 2010 crop year. 
If crop prices remain high, and the 
USDA does not signifi cantly increase 
CRP rental rates, then a signifi cant 
portion of this land will be brought 
back into production. But relief from 
high crop prices will not come until 
the 2010 crop is harvested. Because 
a signifi cant portion of this land is 
likely going to come of CRP anyway, 
it might make sense for the USDA 
to eliminate penalties on contracts 
that expire in the next three years 
in order to get productive land 
back into production earlier. Bring-
ing back some land into production 
would free up funds for the USDA to 
increase bids on the most environ-
mentally sensitive land that offers 
the greatest environmental benefi ts. 
This proactive policy change could 
preserve the most environmentally 
sensitive land in CRP while allowing 
land that is perhaps needed to grow 
crops to come back into production. 
One drawback of focusing only 
on contracts that expire in the next 
few years is that this would do noth-
ing to keep farmers who just signed 
new contracts under the REX pro-
gram from bringing their land back 
into production. After all, it probably 
makes fi nancial sense for a signifi -
cant number of these farmers to pay 
the relatively small penalty on the 
new contracts and bring their land 
into production. One option that the 
USDA could take would be to rebid 
their entire portfolio of CRP con-
tracts. This would allow the agency 
to concentrate its payments on keep-
ing the most vulnerable land out of 
production—which would require 
signifi cantly higher per-acre rental 
payments—while allowing land 
that is not especially vulnerable to 
be farmed in the 2009 season. This 
would meet the objectives of live-
stock feeders and others who want 
an expanded supply soon while 
simultaneously keeping the most vul-
nerable land out of production. A sen-
sible approach to defi ning what land 
should remain in CRP would be for 
state offi ces to designate conserva-
tion priorities and then to seek land 
within their boundaries that most ef-
fectively meets their objectives. The 
length of the offered CRP contracts 
could be staggered so that not all 
contracts come due in the same year. 
Changing CRP contract rules 
might create its own problems, 
however. The perception that the 
USDA “gave in” to political pres-
sure from livestock and other 
crop user groups might weaken its 
future credibility when it enters 
into contracts. But there are sound 
reasons to believe that changing 
the rules is, in fact, justifi ed. For 
the fi rst time, agriculture is being 
asked to supply both food and fuel. 
Having to meet both demands with 
more than 30 million acres of land 
being held in reserve is diffi cult to 
rationalize. Most people recognize 
that the last two years have led to 
unprecedented changes in agricul-
ture. Choosing to “re-optimize” CRP 
through a combination of penalty 
elimination and aggressive rebid-
ding might be viewed as simply a 
refl ection of this reality, rather than 
a sign of political weakness. ◆
Figure 1. Projected Conservation Reserve Program acres, before and after 
the re-enrollment and extension program
